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Preserving Academic Freedom in Hong Kong:
Lessons from the 'Robert Chung Affair'
Of all the factors that differentiate Hong Kong from the rest of China, one of
the most significant is the extent to which Hong Kong still largely enjoys' the
right to free expression-including a free press, the right to criticize the
government, and the freedom of academics to pursue research that may
occasionally displease the government. These freedoms depend in part upon
formal guarantees in Hong Kong's constitution, but also upon individual
courage and institutional protections. In particular, while academic freedom
is theoretically protected by specific provisions in the Basic Law,2 it will thrive
only if academics are willing to speak out and university leaders vigorously
defend the autonomy of their institutions.
In 1998 1 argued that academic freedom was not adequately protected in
Hong Kong, largely because there are too many links between the government
and the universities and because it would be difficult for individual academics
(an increasing percentage of whom are not 'tenured') to assert their rights
under the Basic Law.3 It also appeared that the central government had done
its best to 'co-opt' university leaders in the transition period (e g by appointing
them to the Preparatory Committee and other bodies overseeing Hong Kong's
return to China).4 I thus feared that university administrators would be
tempted to embrace academic freedom publicly while quietly taking pains to
avoid displeasing the local and central governments. This was particularly
worrying because there were signs of increased centralization in our universities,
1 I say 'largely enjoys' because there have been some worrying developments, such as the recent
decision upholding the constitutionality of two Hong Kong ordinances prohibiting desecration of
the national and regional flags. The Court of Appeal had struck down the laws (as violating Article
39 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China (hereinafter the 'Basic Law'), which came into force on 1 July 1997). However the Court
of Final Appeal upheld the laws, primarily on the ground that they constituted a restriction on the
form of expression rather than on content. See HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu [199912 HKC 10 (Court of
Appeal) and [2000] HKC 117 (Court of Final Appeal). The decision has been criticized as a
'setback for the protection of rights' in Hong Kong. See Raymond Wacks, 'Our Flagging Rights'
(2000) 30 Hong Kong Law Journal 1, p 3.
See Basic Law, especially arts 34 and 137.
See Carole Petersen, 'Preserving Institutions of Autonomy in Hong Kong: The Impact of 1997 on
Academia and the Legal Profession' (1998) 22 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 337,
especially pp 341-9.4 For a discussion of this 'co-option' process, see Law Wing-Wah, 'The Accommodation and
Resistance to the Decolonisation, Neocolonisation and Recolonisation of Higher Education in
Hong Kong', in Mark Bray and W 0 Lee, eds, Education and Political Transition: Implications for Hong
Kong's Change of Sovereignty (Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong
1997), especially at pp 54-5.
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giving more power to central administrators and less autonomy to individual
faculties and academics.5
In some respects, the 'Robert Chung affair' (as it is now widely known) has
demonstrated that academic freedom is still alive and well in Hong Kong.
However, in other respects it is disconcerting and further substantiates the
argument that academic freedom is under threat. Indeed, a review of the
incident (particularly the actions of the Hong Kong government and the
Council of the University of Hong Kong) demonstrates that there is an urgent
need for institutional reforms-both to protect the freedom of individual
academics and to bolster the autonomy of the universities.
On July 7, 2000, Dr Robert Chung, an academic at the University of Hong
Kong, published an article claiming that he had been pressured to discontinue
a public opinion research project that tracked the declining popularity of Mr
Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong government. In
particular, Dr Chung alleged that:
Last year, more than once, I was given a clear message from Mr. Tung via
a special channel that my polling activities were not welcomed. Mr. Tung
did not like me polling his popularity or the Government's credibility. I was
told that he did not like to see universities involved in such activities and
that our polls should stop.6
One week later, under pressure to reveal the identity the 'special channel',
Dr Chung stated that it was none other than Professor Cheng Yiu-chung, the
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong. Dr Chung asserted that the
Vice-Chancellor had sent a message (via Pro-Vice-Chancellor Professor
Wong Siu Lun) that the Chief Executive was unhappy with the opinion polls
and that he should stop them.
The strong reaction to Dr Chung's allegations (both at the University itself
and in the general community) demonstrates that Hong Kong people do indeed
value free expression. The Vice-Chancellor cut short his holiday in England
and returned to Hong Kong to face protesting students and hordes of reporters.
He later held a press conference in which he denied exerting political pressure
on Dr Chung to stop conducting the polls. However, the Vice-Chancellor
admitted that a Senior Special Assistant to the Chief Executive, Mr Andrew
Lo, had visited him in his office at the University. The Vice-Chancellor stated
that the meeting had been scheduled at the request of Mr Lo and that the
' See Gerald A Postiglione, 'Hong Kong's Universities Within the Global Academy', in Gerald A
Postiglione and James TH Tang, eds, Hong Kong's Reunion With China: Global Dimensions (HKU
Press 1997).
6 See Dr Robert Chung, 'Pressure to stop opinion polls not welcome', and the accompanying news
report 'Tung tried to warn me off, says pollster', South China Morning Post, 7 July 2000, p 1.
primary topic had been Dr Chung's opinion poll research project. He recalled
that Mr Lo had raised questions about the project (such as whether the
University monitored the polls and who decided on the topics). The Vice-
Chancellor also stated that Mr Lo had offered a 'comment'-which was that Mr
Lo felt that there was a 'conflict of roles' between Dr Chung's role as a pollster
and his role as a 'political commentator', as Dr Chung had once written to the
Chief Executive 'giving certain suggestions on political policy'.7 The Vice-
Chancellor admitted that this 'expression of views' by a member of the Chief
Executive's office had led him to become concerned about the opinion poll
research project8 and that he later discussed the visit from Mr Lo with his Pro-
Vice-Chancellors. However, he insisted that he had never induced Pro-Vice-
Chancellor Wong Siu Lun to exert any pressure on Dr Chung.'
The Council of the University (which is the University's governing body
and includes a majority of external members)10 exercised its statutory powers
to appoint an Independent Investigation Panel (the 'Panel') to investigate and
'ascertain the facts' surrounding the allegations of interference with academic
freedom." The Vice-Chancellor was asked, and agreed, to extend his leave
until the investigation was completed. The Panel was chaired by Sir Noel
Power, former Vice-President (and for a time Acting Chief Justice) of the High
Court, and included two independent members, Mr Ronny Wong (a senior
barrister and former Chairman of the Bar Association) and Mrs Pamela Chan
Wong-shui (the Chief Executive of Hong Kong's Consumer Council).
In an effort to ensure transparency, the Panel held public hearings, which
were televised and widely reported on in the press. The proceedings were
similar to those of a court hearing. Witnesses could, if they wished, be
represented by lawyers and had the right to cross-examine (either in person or
through their lawyers) other witnesses. In view of the seriousness of the
allegations, the Panel expressly adopted the criminal standard of proof-
Statement by Professor YC Cheng, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, 21 July 2000
(copy on file with the author), p 2. These are the words used by the Vice-Chancellor in his
statement to the press. In the hearings, Mr Lo stated that he had only queried 'in the mildest and
most polite manner' whether there might be a possibility of a conflict of roles. See Daily Hearing
Transcripts of the Independent Investigation Panel (available at http://jmsc.hku.hk/hkupanel) at
day 33, p 3 4 of 43. For press reports of the Vice-Chancellor's statement, see Angela Lee and Susan
Shiu, 'Tung aide queried pollster role: University head reveals key January meeting', South China
Morning Post, 22 July 2000, p 1.8 Statement by Professor YC Cheng, note 7 above, p 4. It was subsequently revealed that Mr Lo had
also visited Professor Arthur Li, the Vice-Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and
offered comments on public opinion polls on the government that were conducted by members of
that university.
9 Ibidp 3.
to See the University of Hong Kong 1999-2000 Calendar, pp 52-3, para 3 (showing membership of
the Council).
n See Resolution of the Council of the University of Hong Kong, 25 July 2000 (as quoted at pars 7
of the 'Report to the Council of the University of Hong Kong by the Independent Investigation
Panel', 26 August 2000 (available on the University of Hong Kong website http://www.hku.hk/
reportip.html) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Report').
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beyond a reasonable doubt. The Panel also adopted, for the purposes of the
investigation, a definition of academic freedom, which included the 'unhindered
freedom to explore a given subject to the extent that our rational powers of
investigation are capable; and the freedom to do so without influence or
pressures external to the process'. 2 This definition was put to all of the
principal witnesses and none took any exception to it.'3
The Chief Executive, Mr Tung Chee-hwa, was invited to appear before the
panel but declined to do so, claiming that he had to protect the dignity of his
office and that he had 'no relevant evidence to give'.14 However, Mr Lo (the
member of the Chief Executive's office who had visited the Vice-Chancellor)
did appear. Other witnesses included Dr Chung, the Vice-Chancellor, several
Pro-Vice Chancellors and other members of the University. The Vice-
Chancellor and Mr Lo were each represented by senior counsel (who extensively
cross-examined other witnesses, particularly Dr Chung).
After more than two weeks of hearings, the Panel delivered its Report" to
the University's Council. The Panel's Report concluded, inter alia, that as a
result of the meeting between Mr Lo and the Vice-Chancellor, one of the Pro-
Vice-Chancellors, Professor Wong Siu-lun (acting at the behest of the Vice-
Chancellor) had conveyed a message to Dr Chung that was 'calculated to
inhibit his right to academic freedom'. 6 In particular, the Panel decided that
two meetings between the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Dr Chung constituted(covert attempts to push Dr Chung into discontinuing his polling work.' 17
Perhaps even more damning was the fact that the Panel concluded that both
the Vice-Chancellor and Mr Lo had given less than full and accurate testimony
about the meeting at which they had initially discussed Dr Chung's research.
The Panel stated that 'having considered carefully the evidence of the Vice-
Chancellor and Mr Lo and mindful of their demeanor when giving it, we are
satisfied that neither witness disclosed the full and truthful extent of what was
said in that meeting."8 In particular, the Panel found that Mr Lo had failed to
explain contradictions in his evidence and that:
12 Report, note 1 above, para 1 I.
'3 Ibid.
14 Ibid, para 12. See also Ng Kang-chung and Angela Li, 'Tung snubs poll inquiry', South China
Morning Post, 2 August 2000, p 1.
:5 Report, note I1 above.
16 Ibid, para 109.
17 Ibid, para 105. With respect to the first meeting (on 6 January 1999) all three panel members were
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Professor Wong met with Dr Chung at the behest of the
Vice-Chancellor and conveyed a message that was calculated to inhibit his right to academic
freedom. With respect to the second meeting (on 1 November 1999), all three members were
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such a message was conveyed by Professor Wong and a
majority of the Panel were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Professor Wong was acting at
the behest of the Vice-Chancellor. One member of the panel was only satisfied 'on a balance of
probabilities' (the lower, civil standard of proof) that the second meeting was held at the behest
of the Vice-Chancellor. Ibid, para 109.
18 Ibid, para 99.
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Mr Lo was a poor and untruthful witness. The panel was left with the clear
impression that he was not recalling and recounting what had actually
happened at his meeting with the Vice-Chancellor but was giving a
sanitized version of that conversation in order to distance himself as far as
he could from any suggestion of criticism of the work of Dr Chung. 9
The Council first met to consider the Report on Friday 1 September. The
Vice-Chancellor received the Report that morning, in advance of the Council
meeting, and he immediately denounced it. Indeed, the Vice-Chancellor
'cancelled' his leave, returned to active duty, and attempted to attend the
Council meeting as a full member (although he was ultimately persuaded to
leave the meeting after making his statement). Lawyers for Mr Lo made a
submission (which was later withdrawn) asking the Council to delay releasing
the Report to the public. The Council had also received a letter, signed by 42
chair professors, stating that they did not think that the facts of the Robert
Chung affair substantiated a 'conclusion of deliberate interference of academic
freedom' (although it should be noted that this letter was drafted and signed
before the signatories would have seen the Report and the letter does not
indicate whether the signatories had observed the hearings and heard the
evidence)."0 The Council agreed to release the Report immediately to the
public but took no further action on it at the 1 September meeting. It was
reported that certain Council members had expressed 'reservations' as to
whether the Council should formally adopt the Report and that this issue had
therefore been deferred to a meeting scheduled for 6 September.
At this stage, many academic staff at the University became concerned that
the Council might refuse to formally adopt the Report. They believed that this
would cause irreparable damage to the University's reputation, as it would
convey the impression that the Council was unwilling to accept a Report
because of the unfavourable findings regarding the Vice-Chancellor, a Pro-
Vice-Chancellor, and a leading government official. A petition was quickly
drafted and circulated by email. The petition was confined to one issue of
principle-the Council must not reject the Report of the Independent Panel
simply because it did not like its conclusions. Given that the Council had used
its statutory powers to delegate to the Panel the responsibility of finding the
facts, those findings must be regarded as valid unless and until a party
concerned successfully challenged it through the process of judicial review.
Within three days, 439 academics, more than half of the academic staff of the
University of Hong Kong, had signed this petition. This was an impressive
19 Ibid, para 36.
2' Letter dated 26 August 2000, addressed to the University Council and signed by 42 Chair
Professors of the University of Hong Kong (copy on file with the author), para 2.
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show of unity, particularly as many of the signatories do not have tenure but
rather were appointed under contracts, which the University has no legal
obligation to renew. Signatories included six of the nine deans of faculties, 14
associate deans, and 26 heads of department or centres within the University.
The petition was delivered to Council on 6 September, the date of its resumed
meeting.
Although the petition did not call upon the Council to take any particular
action beyond adopting the Report, it did demonstrate (albeit indirectly) that
the Vice-Chancellor had lost credibility with the majority of his staff, including
a majority of the deans. Moreover, by 6 September, certain alumni groups had
also sent petitions to Council (some of which directly called for the resignation
of the Vice-Chancellor). These rapid developments-all within a few days
after the Report was released-demonstrated that it would be impossible for
the Vice-Chancellor to continue to lead the University. Shortly before the
Council meeting resumed on 6 September, the Vice-Chancellor and Pro-Vice
Chancellor Wong offered their resignations (although both continued to
dispute the findings of the Panel). 2'
Thus far the story reads like a strong victory for academic freedom-an
academic had the courage to speak out; his allegations were upheld by an
independent investigation conducted though public hearings; the Report was
published and ultimately brought about the resignation of the most powerful
member of the University.
But that is not the end of the story. The postscript is that the University
Council never did formally adopt that Report. The dual resignations were
announced at the start of the Council's resumed meeting, on 6 September. The
Chairman of the Council, Mr Yang Ti-liang (an external member) then
immediately introduced a series of motions (which were rapidly read and
passed) to the effect that the Council would simply 'note' the Report rather
than formally adopt it. This course of action was taken over the strong
objection of the student members of the Council and the majority of the deans
of faculties. Arguing that the motions had been rushed through, without
opportunity for debate, the University members managed to re-open the issue
and put forward a motion to formally adopt the Report. However, after two
hours of debate it was clear that the external members opposed this motion and
would defeat it if it came to a vote. The deans decided that it would be
disastrous for the University's reputation if Council were to reject a motion to
adopt the Report. Thus they reluctantly decided to withdraw the motion.
21 The Vice-Chancellor resigned from the University. Professor Wong resigned from his position as
Pro-Vice-Chancellor but retained his position as a teacher in the University. However, he went
on leave for the remainder of the semester.
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In essence, the University members of the Council were over ruled by the
external members. The question is why? When the Council appointed the
Independent Investigation Panel and delegated to it the responsibility of
finding the facts, it had implicitly undertaken to respect the Panel's findings.
Clearly the Council was in no position to substitute its own judgment for the
judgment of the Panel members who had actually heard and considered all the
evidence. The suggestion (implied in the statement to the public by Council
Chairman Yang Ti-liang following the meeting22 ) that there was some doubt
as to the definition of academic freedom would not justify rejecting the Report,
as the Panel had adopted an explicit definition of academic freedom, to which
none of the parties had objected. Thus, the refusal by the Council's external
members to formally adopt the Report has naturally given rise to intense
speculation. Rumors have circulated (though denied) that a secret deal was
made between the Chairman and the Vice-Chancellor shortly before the
meeting-to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor would offer his resignation
in exchange for a promise that the Chairman would lobby strongly against any
motion to adopt the Report. 3 Others have suggested that Council members
feared that the Vice-Chancellor might apply for judicial review if the Report
was adopted, thus tying up the University in protracted legal proceedings.
However, we should also consider whether the refusal to formally adopt the
Report can be attributed, at least in part, to pressure exerted by the Hong Kong
government. To appreciate the strength of that pressure, we must first review
the many 'links' between the University and the government. The University
of Hong Kong is a public university and depends almost entirely upon the
government for funding. Although the official funding body (the University
Grants Committee) is supposed to serve as a 'buffer' between the government
and the universities, that Committee is actually appointed by the Chief
Executive. The Chief Executive also serves as the 'Chancellor' of the University.
While this is considered a largely ceremonial role, it does give him certain
powers-should he choose to exercise them. Moreover, the Chairman of the
University Council (who chaired all the Council meetings on this incident
and put forth the motion to simply 'note' the Report) was appointed by the
Chief Executive and is also a member of his Executive Council (the closest
thing that Hong Kong has to a cabinet). In my view, these factors combine to
create an uncomfortably close linkage between the government and the
University's governing body.
*2 See Chairman's Statement to the Public, 6 September 2000 (copy on file with the author),
para 8b.
* See No Kwai-yan, ' "Cultural Revolution" fear', South China Morning Post, 9 September 2000,
p 2 (quoting the denial by University Council Chairman Yang Ti-liang that there was any 'under-
the-table' deal between him and the former Vice-Chancellor).
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Given these ties (and the fact that the underlying allegation in this case was
that it was the Chief Executive's disapproval of a research project that led the
Vice-Chancellor to try to stop it), the Chief Executive clearly had a duty to
refrain from any actions that could be interpreted as an attempt to influence
the University Council. Unfortunately, he did quite the opposite. For example,
although he had refused to appear before the Panel (insisting that he had no
relevant evidence to give24 ) he then made statements in the press commenting
on the underlying events. During the Panel hearings, two University witnesses
(Professor Cheng Kai-ming and Professor Felice Lieh-mak) testified that the
Vice-Chancellor had told them that the Chief Executive had personally met
with the Vice-Chancellor and raised three concerns, all of which were
'political' in nature and one of which was Robert Chung's opinion polls. This
was a key development in the hearings as their testimony directly contradicted
that of the Vice-Chancellor. The very next day (while the hearings were still
on-going) the Chief Executive issued a press release denying that he had ever
mentioned the opinion poll research project to the Vice Chancellor.2 5 Of
course, since the Chief Executive declined to appear before the Panel his
denial was never subject to cross-examination. It should be noted that had he
taken similar actions during a court hearing, the Chief Executive could have
been subject to contempt of court. 6
Similarly, when the Panel's Report became public, the Chief Executive
publicly disputed its findings of fact. He did this before the University Council
had decided whether to formally adopt the Report. In particular, the Chief
Executive was quoted in the press as stating that he took 'great exception' to
the Panel's finding that his assistant, Mr Lo, had been a poor and untruthful
witness, insisting that he had known Mr Lo for many years and that he was an
'honest person'.27 By making these statements in the press, the Chief Executive
made it clear that he was exceedingly displeased by the Report and it is not
difficult to see how such statements might bear on the minds of Council
members when deliberating whether to formally adopt it. Equally worrying is
the fact that shortly before the University Council was scheduled to meet and
24 See note 14 above.
25 See Angela Li and Ng Kang-chung, 'Tung "told top don of poll fears"' South China Morning Post,
16 August 2000, p 1.
26 Professor Albert Chen, Dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Hong Kong, also expressed
this view and was quoted (after the Council had completed its consideration of the matter) as
stating that '[tihe rule of law implies equality of all persons before the law. So if the Chief Executive
wants to give any views on questions which came up during the enquiry, the proper channel for him
to do so is to appear as a witness before the panel instead of using the Chief Executive's Office to
release a press statement to contradict what appeared in evidence in the course of the hearing.' See
Angela Li, 'Tung's comments "similar to contempt"', South China Morning Post, 16 September2000
, p 6.
27 See Press Release of the Chief Executive, 1 September 2000 (available at http://www.info.gov.hk
ce/cepr.htm). See also Chris Yeung, 'University chiefs meddled with polls on Tung, inquiry finds',
South China Morning Post, 2 September 2000, p 1.
172 Comment (2000) HKLJ
Preserving academic freedom in Hong Kong 173
receive the Panel's Report, the Chief Executive suddenly summoned Mr Yang
Ti-liang, Chairman of the University's Council, to a private meeting. We will
never know what was actually said at that meeting. An article in the Chinese
press reported that the Chief Executive asked the Chairman to 'handle the
matter better'.,8 The official explanation was that Mr Tung was not acting as
Chief Executive during that meeting but rather was acting in his capacity as
the University's Chancellor and simply wanted to express his 'concern' for the
institution!29 Clearly there was a conflict of interest in the Chief Executive's
two roles here. It was inappropriate for the Chief Executive to choose this
particular moment to play more than a strictly ceremonial role as Chancellor
of the University.
In the unlikely event that any doubt remained in the minds of Council
members about the Chief Executive's views of the Panel's Report, the press also
reported that the Department of Justice had made a submission, on behalf of
Mr Lo, urging the Council not to adopt the Panel's Report.3 This situation
arose from another mistake (one that the Secretary for Justice, Ms Elsie Leung,
could have avoided). During the public hearings before the Panel, the Justice
Department served as the instructing solicitors for Mr Lo and a government
lawyer sat at counsel's table throughout the hearings.3" Of course, it is not
uncommon for the Department of Justice to represent a government employee
involved in civil proceedings. However, in this particular case (in which the
chief allegation was government interference in university autonomy and
academic freedom), the Secretary for Justice should have recognized the need
for outside solicitors. There would be no objection to the government paying
for Mr Lo's legal representation (especially as it appears likely that his visit to
the Vice-Chancellor was in the course of his employment). However,
government lawyers should not have been put in the position of defending
him. Once they were assigned to do so they were obligated to do their best for
their client, including preparing a submission arguing that the Report was
flawed. In so doing the Justice Department once again sent a message that the
Hong Kong government did not want that Report adopted.
28 'Tung requests "handle the case better" ', Ming Pao, 2 September 2000.
29 See Angela Li, 'Tung's "concern" led to meeting', South China Morning Post, 3 September 2000,
p 4 (quoting the government's Information Co-ordinator Stephen Lam Sui-lung).
30 See 'Tung aide to lobby against "slurs" ', South China Morning Post, 5 September 2000, p 1.
31 See Report, note 11 above, para 13, noting that Mr Lo was 'represented by Mr Alan Hoo, SC,
assisted by Mr Johnny Mok and instructed by the Department of Justice'. It was later reported that
outside solicitors represented Mr Lo (in lieu of the Department of Justice) at the Council's second
meeting to consider the Report (on 6 September). See Angela Li, 'Tung aidepoints to "defects"
in report', South China Morning Post, 7 September 2000, p 3. It is not clear why the substitution
was made-perhaps the Department of Justice finally recognized that its representation of Mr Lo
could be interpreted as government interference in the University's autonomy. In any event, the
appointment of outside solicitors for this meeting of Council came too late, as by then k was already
public knowledge that government lawyers had been representing Mr Lo and arguing that the
Council should not adopt the Report.
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The views expressed by the Chief Executive and his government were all
the more significant because of the membership of the Council. It is dominated
by external members, most of whom are drawn from Hong Kong's conservative
business community and may well be loathe to offend the Chief Executive or
his government. This is why the Chief Executive and his government should
have been extra careful not to express any views on the Report or on the action
that the Council should take with regard to it. The failure to refrain from doing
so undermined previous assurances that the government would not interfere
in the Council's decision. Indeed, public speculation about the government's
role became so strong that the Chief Executive's Office found it necessary to
issue a statement denying claims that the Chief Executive's Office had
contacted non-university members of the Council to lobby against adoption
of the Panel's Report.32
The Council did, at least, agree that 'further work will be done by the
University on the issue of academic freedom'.33 I thus conclude by considering
what steps can be taken to better protect academic freedom and university
autonomy.
The first thing that the University should do is to formally endorse the Lima
Declaration on Academic Freedom and Autonomy of Institutions of Higher
Education.34 The University should also treat with great caution any proposals
to 'restructure' the University in ways that would reduce the autonomy of
faculties and individual academics. Only a few months ago, a proposal was
circulated at the University (for general consultation) that suggested that
departments and faculties might be merged into a small number of large
'schools', each headed by a full-time administrator who would not be elected
(as most deans currently are) but rather appointed by the Vice-Chancellor.
Such a structure would make the University far more centralized and significantly
less democratic. I argued (at a forum on the proposal) that restructuring along
these lines could endanger academic freedom - an issue that apparently had
not been expressly considered when the proposal had been drafted. 5 It is my
3 See Angela Li and Susan Shiu, 'University image 'rests on council overhaul" ', South China
Morning Post, 8 September 2000, p 2, quoting the Chief Executive's Office as stating that 'The
Government has not contacted council members to interfere with their decision'.
33 Note 22 above, para 8b.
34 The University Senate considered the Declaration in 1994 and noted that it was consistent with
the University's Mission and Goals. But recent events clearly demonstrate a need to formally adopt
it.35 After I raised my concerns the management consultants and certain members of the University
who were conducting the consultation on the proposal did state that consideration would be given
to academic freedom issues in future discussions of the proposal. However, in my view, the potential
threat to academic freedom is inherent in any proposal that would consolidate the faculties and
transfer powers from elected deans to appointed directors of a small number of large 'schools'.
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understanding that this proposal is now 'on hold' and not being actively
pursued. (No doubt the Acting Vice-Chancellor has more than enough to do
in the aftermath of the Robert Chung affair.) However, there is no guarantee
that the proposal will not be revived. In my view, any suggestions for greater
centralization (both of academic and budgeting powers) should be viewed with
a healthy scepticism and with due regard for the potential impact upon
academic freedom-particularly in the political context of Hong Kong, the
only place in the People's Republic of China that currently enjoys academic
freedom and the right to criticize the government. I also suggest that the
central administration should consider returning to individual faculties at
least a portion of the money that was 'top-sliced' from faculty budgets to create
the very substantial 'discretionary fund' maintained by the former Vice-
Chancellor. In times of increasingly tight budgets, certain faculties felt that
they could not maintain strength without receiving special grants from this
fund. This made it difficult for faculties to express opposition to the Vice-
Chancellor on other issues.
Finally, we must consider the governance of the University. It seems clear
that the linkages between the Council and the Hong Kong government
need to be reduced. The Chief Executive should no longer serve as the
University's Chancellor. Nor should any member of his Executive Council
serve as Chancellor or as a member of the Council. Moreover, while it is no
doubt healthy to have a certain number of external members on the Council,
this incident (and the sharp division between the University and external
members) raises the question of whether external members should constitute
the majority of members. We should also consider how the external members
are chosen. The problem is that the interests of the government (and other
powerful institutions) will inevitably collide with academic freedom from time
to time. When they do, we need to know that our Council members will be
willing to stand up for the autonomy of the institution and the freedom of
individual academics. This is more likely to occur if a majority of members of
the Council clearly understand and appreciate the importance of academic
freedom, have no links with government, and are free from considerations of
an extraneous nature (such as how their commercial interests might be
detrimentally affected if they take decisions that displease the local or central
governments).
The simple and inescapable truth is that Hong Kong is now a part of a
country that does not generally allow criticism of the government. Although
the Basic Law promises that Hong Kong will enjoy that freedom, it would be
naive to assume that any law will be sufficient on its own. We also need strong
institutional mechanisms to protect academic freedom. Indeed, the most
important lesson of the Robert Chung affair is that threats to academic freedom
are not confined to explicit laws or policies, which an academic could theoretically
Vol 30 Part 2 Preserving academic freedom in Hong Kong 175
challenge in court as violating the Basic Law or the Bill of Rights. 6 Rather, the
most dangerous threats are the covert ones-the private meetings in which a
senior academic expresses 'concern' to a junior colleague, genuinely believing
that she will enjoy a brighter future at the University if she would only pursue
less controversial research or steer away from certain 'political' topics in the
classroom. The University of Hong Kong, and indeed all educational institutions
in Hong Kong, must take steps to better protect academics from this kind of
pressure. By so doing, Hong Kong's universities can hopefully avoid declining
into the 'culture of subservience' that Professor Ying Chan warned against in
her submission to the Panel.37
The first step in this process is for the University of Hong Kong's Council
to formally accept the findings of the Independent Investigation Panel. The
most disappointing thing about the failure of the Council to adopt the Report
is that it creates the impression that the Council is unwilling to fully acknowledge
the seriousness of the incident or the urgent need for institutional change. This
was evident in the public statement given by the Chairman of the Council
immediately following the decision to simply 'note' the Report rather than
adopt it. Mr Yang insisted that '[iut is clearly in the best interests of the
University to put this matter behind it and to move forward' (emphasis
added). 3 With respect, it is not in the interests of the University to simply put
the matter behind it. We can only move forward (in a positive direction) if we
face up to the conclusions in the Report and take action to strengthen academic
freedom-both the freedom of individual academics and the University's
autonomy from government.
Carole J Petersen*
36 Section 7(1) of the Bill of Rights Ordinance provides that it binds only the government and all
public authorities. However, there is authority for the proposition that the University should be
considered a 'public authority' for the purposes of s 7(1). See Hong Kong Polytechnic University v
Next Magazine (1996) 6 HKPLR 117 and Hong Kong Polytechnic University v Next Magazine (1996)
7 HKPLR 41, 44-5 (High Court). On appeal, die Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that
the university was a public authority and reversed the decision on other grounds. However, Litton
VP noted in dicta that the conclusion that the university was a public authority 'seems to me
somewhat doubtful'. (1997) 7 HKPLR 286, 291.
37 For a commentary on this issue, see Sin-iuing Shaw, 'Back to a culture of subservience', South
China Morning Pest, 27 August 2000, p 11.38 Note 22 above, para 6.
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong. Thanks are due to Andrew
Byrnes, Johannes Chan and Richard Glofcheski for comments on a previous draft. However the
views expressed here are entirely my own.
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